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 1 
Ethical Issues in Computational Pathology 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores ethical issues raised by Whole Slide Image-based 
computational pathology. After briefly giving examples drawn from some recent 
literature of advances in this field, we consider some ethical problems it might be 
thought to pose. These arise from (1) the tension between AI research – with its 
hunger for more and more data—and the default preference in data ethics and data 
protection law for the minimisation of personal data collection and processing; (2) the 
fact that computational pathology lends itself to kinds of data fusion that go against 
data ethics norms and some norms of biobanking; (3) the fact that AI methods are 
esoteric and produce results that are sometimes unexplainable (the so-called “black 
box” problem); (4) the fact that computational pathology is particularly dependent on 
scanning technology manufacturers with interests of their own in profit-making from 
data collection. We shall suggest that most of these issues are resolvable. 
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Digital Pathology is cellular pathology conducted with digital whole slide images (WSIs) 
rather than tissue sections and light microscopes. The use of WSIs obviates transport and 
physical sharing of tissue samples, with cost savings and reductions of damage to, or loss of, 
glass slides. WSIs are generally clear and detailed, even at low levels of magnification, and 
allow rotation, panning and zooming.1   WSIs can improve clinical workflow.  They can aid 
                                                 
1 Bradley, A. & Jacobsen, M. (2019). Toxicologic pathology forum: opinion on considerations for the 
use of whole slide images in GLP pathology peer review. Toxicologic Pathology 47(2), 100-107. 
 2 
collaboration: a few experts in different places can work at the same time on analyses of the 
same slide images for diagnostic and prognostic purposes. In principle, WSIs could even 
permit expert crowdsourcing of morphological analyses. They have clear uses for teaching 
pathology2 and for routine quality assurance (e.g., by United Kingdom National External 
Quality Assurance Service (UKNEQUAS)) of pathology practice, without the need to send 
slides to each of several hundred pathologists during the year. Some of these latter 
advantages of using WSIs are shared with “telepathology”, the longer-established practice 
of transmitting images from a remote-controlled light microscope e.g. for obtaining second 
opinions.  
 
Digital  pathology is not entirely free of ethical issues. For one thing, if it is collaborative, it 
can involve sharing of sensitive personal data, which is subject to distinctive ethical and 
legal norms. There is also the fact that the scanners used to make WSIs are a new 
technology only recently permitted for use by regulators in the US and the UK following 
large-scale validation studies.3 The Royal College of Pathologists in the UK found that, by the 
beginning of 2018, very few sufficiently large studies of the reliability of interpretation using 
                                                 
2 Niazi, M. K. K., Parwani, A. V. & Gurcan, M. N. (2019) ‘Digital pathology and artificial intelligence’ 
The Lancet Oncology 20, e253–61; Madabhushi, A. & Lee, G. (2016). Image analysis and machine 
learning in digital pathology: Challenges and opportunities’ Medical Image Analysis 33. 170–175. 
3 Snead, D. R. J., Tsang, Y. W., Meskiri, A., Kimani, P. K., Crossman, R., Rajpoot, N. M., Blessing, 
E., Chen, K., Gopalakrishnan, K., Matthews, P., Momtahan, N., Read‐Jones, S., Sah, S., Simmons, 
E., Sinha, B., Suortamo, S., Yeo, Y., El Daly, H. & Cree, I. A. (2016). Validation of digital pathology 
imaging for primary histopathological diagnosis. Histopathology 68, 1063– 1072; Mukhopadhyay, S., 
Feldman, M. D., Abels, E., Ashfaq, R., Beltaifa, S., Cacciabeve, N. G., Cathro, H. P., Cheng, L., Cooper, 
K., Dickey, G. E., Gill, R. M., Heaton, R. P., Jr, Kerstens, R., Lindberg, G. M., Malhotra, R. K., Mandell, J. 
W., Manlucu, E. D., Mills, A. M., Mills, S. E., Moskaluk, C. A., … Taylor, C. R. (2018). Whole slide 
imaging versus microscopy for primary diagnosis in surgical pathology: A multicenter blinded 
randomized noninferiority study of 1992 cases (pivotal study). The American Journal of Surgical 
Pathology 42(1), 39–52. 
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WSIs had been completed, and some of these were not independent enough of scanner 
manufacturers to justify full confidence.4  
 
Pathology carried out with WSIs is an enabler of computational pathology: artificial 
intelligence (AI)-aided modelling, analysis and discovery of patterns in large sets of high-
resolution and information-rich WSIs. Computational pathology, rather than digital 
pathology, is the concern of this paper. Crudely, we focus on machine learning applied to 
WSIs --as opposed to the use by pathologists of WSIs in preference to slides and light 
microscopes.  After briefly giving examples drawn from  recent literature of advances in 
computational pathology, we consider some ethical problems it might be thought to pose. 
These arise from (1) the tension between AI research –with its hunger for more and more 
data—and the default preference in data ethics and data protection law (in this paper EU 
and UK data protection law are considered) for the minimisation of personal data collection 
and processing;   (2) the fact that computational pathology lends itself to kinds of data 
fusion that prima facie go against some data ethics norms and some norms of biobanking; 
(3) the fact that AI methods are esoteric and produce results that are sometimes 
unexplainable even to experts (the so-called “black box” problem); and (4) the fact that 
computational pathology is particularly dependent on scanning technology manufacturers 
with interests of their own in profit-making from data collection.   
 
I. Computational pathology: some examples 
                                                 
4 Cross, S., Furness, P. Igali, L., Snead, D.& Treanor, D. (2018) Best practice recommendations for 
implementing digital pathology. Royal College of Pathologists. Retrieved from, 
https://www.rcpath.org/uploads/assets/f465d1b3-797b-4297-b7fedc00b4d77e51/Best-practice-
recommendations-for-implementing-digital-pathology.pdf §§ 2.4 and 2.5. 
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Computational pathology can quickly classify malignancy (or normalcy) in WSIs. It can be 
used to predict patient outcome and life-expectancies for different cancer types.  It can also 
identify patterns from the fusion of heterogeneous data e.g. test results of biobanked 
samples, clinical notes in a natural language, and WSIs of tissue resection or tissue 
microarrays. Practitioners of digital pathology can often assist the development of 
computational pathology – e.g. with annotations of whole slide images and validation of 
computational algorithms – but computational pathology involves more computational 
techniques than pathology per se.  
 
To enlarge on  possibilities of diagnosis and prognosis  afforded by computational 
pathology, Madabhushi and Lee5 describe quantitative histomorphometry (QH) analysis, 
“which can now enable a detailed spatial interrogation (e.g. capturing nuclear orientation, 
texture, shape, architecture) of the entire tumour morphologic landscape and its most 
invasive elements from a standard Hematoxylin and Eosin (H&E) slide.” QH analysis depends 
on the detection and segmentation of nuclei and glands in images.  6 
 
Madabhushi and Lee go on to mention (a) algorithms for identifying stromal features in 
images that have been found relevant to prognosis; (b) algorithms and feature approaches 
for automated tissue classification and disease grading; and (c) histological image-based 
companion diagnostic tests for predicting disease outcome. There is a distinction between  
“domain inspired” approaches, i.e. approaches geared to specific disease (e.g. cancer) types, 
                                                 
5 op. cit. note 2. 
6 Ibid: 171 
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and  “domain agnostic” approaches that cut across several types.7  Certain domain-agnostic 
approaches use gland shape and size, tissue texture and architecture in prognosis and 
grading, e.g. wavelet and tissue texture features for automated Gleason grading of prostate 
pathology images. By contrast, “[d]omain inspired features … are typically specific to a 
particular domain or in some cases to a particular disease or organ site. An example of this 
class of feature is the co-occurring gland angularity feature presented by Lee et al8 which 






 Niazi et. al. mention the possibilities of exploiting not regions but the total area of a tissue 
section from a whole slide image. For example, 
 
a whole slide is partitioned into superpixels on the basis of similarity at some 
magnification. Superpixels are grouped into anatomical regions (specifically 
epithelium) on the basis of graph clustering… Finally, each cluster is classified as 
ductal carcinoma in situ or benign or normal on the basis of features extracted by 
deep learning…10 
  
                                                 
7 Ibid: 172 
8 op. cit. note 2 
9 op. cit. note 7: 172 
10 op. cit. note 2: e257 
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And this is not the only instance of work using the whole of WSI content.11Finally, the 
literature sometimes points to the power of AI to unify data drawn from, on the one hand, 
patient histories, and, on the other hand, heterogeneous types of tissue-archived  and 
biobanked samples.12   
 
The benefits of computational pathology, then, can be organised under four headings:13 
improved classification of regions and objects of interest in WSIs; facilitated discovery of 
patterns correlating tissue architecture with patient outcomes in specific cancers; facilitated 
discovery of patterns correlating tissue architecture with cancer in general; and the 
detection of patterns involving tissue architecture and further data not derived from WSIs 
to predict e.g. life-expectancies.   
 
II. Computational pathology and personal data 
 
The previous section suggests that, among other things, computational pathology can 
improve diagnosis and prognosis for patients suffering from cancer and other diseases. 
                                                 
11 Lu, W., Graham, S., Bilal, M., Rajpoot, N. & Minhas, F. (2020). Capturing cellular topology in multi-
gigapixel pathology images. Wenqi; The IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern 
Recognition (CVPR) Workshops, 260-261; Javed, S., Mahmood, A., Moazam, M., Navid, F., 
Koohbanani, A., Benes, K., Yee, W. T., Hewitt, K., Epstein, D., Snead, D. & Rajpoot, N. (2020) Cellular 
community detection for tissue phenotyping in colorectal cancer histology images. Medical Image 
Analysis 63.  
12 Niazi, M. K. K., Parwani, A. V. & Gurcan, M. N. (2019) ‘Digital pathology and artificial intelligence’ 
The Lancet Oncology 20: e257–58; Lewis, C., McQuaid, S., Hamilton, P. W., Salto-Tellez, M., McArt, D. 
& James, J. A. (2016). Building a ‘repository of science’: The importance of integrating biobanks 
within molecular pathology programmes’ European Journal of Cancer 67, 191e-199. The claim that 
AI can unify heterogeneous data is compatible with saying that the patient benefits from AI-assisted 
heath research are in need of critical evaluation. See Vollmer, S., Mateen, B., 
Bohner, G., Király, F., Ghani R. & Jonsson, P., (2020). Machine learning and artificial intelligence 
research for patient benefit: 20 critical questions on transparency, replicability, ethics, and 
effectiveness. British Medical Journal 368 :l6927 
13  
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Since earlier, more accurate, diagnosis can lead to more timely and more effective 
treatments, increase the number of cancer survivors and the length of their lives after 
diagnosis, computational pathology has clear moral benefits: life-saving and life-lengthening 
are among the clearest examples of moral benefits there are—other things being equal.14  
 
What, if anything, counterbalances these benefits? Research ethics and local law often 
restrict what can be done with human tissue, and data ethics and law constrain the 
processing of personal data. Whole slide images and the pixels that make them up are 
personal data not in the sense that they always carry explicitly identifying information about 
whose tissue is imaged, but in the sense –embedded in the European General Data 
Protection Regulation15 -- that these identities can be inferred (perhaps using computational 
techniques) e.g. when databases are fused. Again, data ethics and law --we work with the 
GDPR in this paper-- operate with a principle of minimising the collection and processing of 
personal data16 and discourage the repurposing of personal data sets.  If AI-assisted 
analytics on WSIs are to identify reliable biomarkers, however, large amounts of data from 
                                                 
14 It is true that life-saving and life-lengthening are benefits relative to the quality of the life saved. 
Lengthening lives that are already very long or that are oppressive to those leading them are the 
uncommon cases. 
15 “[D]ata subjects are identifiable if they can be directly or indirectly identified, especially by 
reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, location data, an online 
identifier or one of several special characteristics, which expresses the physical, physiological, 












images ---probably the images of tissue derived from a large number of patients over long 
periods of time-- may need to be used to train computational models.    Here is where the 
data hunger of AI runs up against the norm of personal data minimisation from data ethics 
and data processing law.17 Indeed, the hunger in computation pathology for large  amounts 
of personal data is just a special case  of the data hunger  typical of modern machine 
learning (particularly, deep learning) algorithms.18 Again,  adding clinical information or 
longitudinal outcome data to WSI data, though it adds  greatly to the potential for clinically 
useful pattern discovery with the help of AI, sometimes involves repurposing.  
 
At first sight, then, practice in computational pathology seems to flout all or many  of the 
norms governing the use of tissue and personal data derived from it.  As in other instances 
where data ethics seems to tell against an apparently beneficial practice, the key to 
resolving the tension may lie in distinguishing  the case at hand from cases raising a 
stereotypical risk of a privacy-violation or harm on the basis of storage of larger than 
necessary amounts of personal data. Stereotypical risks of privacy violation occur where 
data enables inferences about identifiable people’s current health, wealth, sexual practices, 
political affiliations and friendships. These inferences may allow individuals or organisations 
to  manipulate data subjects or make an economic gain from information about them. If an 
online gambling site extends credit to people who, according to the data collected, 
frequently stake large sums and lose, it may be feeding a gambling addiction and further 
harming the vulnerable. If credit scoring companies with oversimple algorithms unjustifiably 
                                                 
17 Information Commissioner’s Office, Retrieved from https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/principles/data-
minimisation/  
18 Brownlee, J. (2019) How Much Training Data is Required for Machine Learning? Retrieved from 
https://machinelearningmastery.com/much-training-data-required-machine-learning/  
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count a conscientious but poorly paid saver as a probable defaulter, then, again, the access 
of the credit scoring company to detailed information about the low-paid person’s income 
level is morally questionable. These are among the kinds of risk that data ethics and data 
protection law typically cater for. 
 
Data minimisation requirements also make sense where accumulations of personal data in a 
single huge data set would significantly add to its attraction as a target of hacking, or as a 
“hostage” in a ransomware attack, as in the “Wannacry” exploit carried out against National 
Health Service computers, among others, in 2017.19  Differently, a large data set sometimes 
exposes a pattern of behaviour in individually identifiable data subjects that they consider 
private and would not want exposed. The well-known case of the US retailer Target, which 
correctly inferred from the search data of a particular visitor to its website that she was 
pregnant, is relevant here. This visitor turned out to be a teenager whose father complained 
about receiving invitations to purchase pregnancy products and had no idea his daughter 
was pregnant. 20    
 
Could computational pathology pose comparable risks in relation to its data? Here it is 
important to distinguish between (a) the use of a WSI related to a single patient, i.e. a non-
computational digital patholology exercise; and (b) patterns disclosed as part of an AI-
assisted big data exercise, where possibly thousands of WSIs and other data are used to 
discover biomarkers for different cancer types.  For example, the huge amount of data  






contained in a WSI might be more revealing than a tissue sample under a microscope.  
Suppose examination of a WSI revealed an early-stage tumour that would have been missed 
by an ordinary microscopic examination.   In this (a)-type case, could extra data provided by 
the WSI disadvantage a patient wanting to be paid medical insurance (in countries where 
commercial medical insurance is the norm) if the insurer claims it is an undeclared condition 
that pre-dated the policy?   
 
An insurer might dispute liability, but what is normally at issue in such a dispute is not 
whether a cancer predates a policy, but whether the patient knows of the cancer when 
taking out a policy,  and fails to declare as much. The introduction of WSI-based diagnosis 
may result in patients knowing earlier about cancers, but it is unclear why it should lead to 
their feigning ignorance of a cancer when applying for insurance, or being suspected of 
feigning ignorance by insurers. It is true that insurers might in the future require 
information regarding an insurance applicant’s previous WSI-based diagnoses and 
prognoses   for cancer; but it is unclear that this will lead to more disputed claims or more 
refusals on the part of insurance companies to offer policies to individuals in the first place. 
On the contrary, earlier, WSI-assisted diagnosis may make cancers more readily treatable 
and reduce costs for insurers.    
 
In any case, it is (b)-type cases we are concerned with in this paper. Computational 
pathology directed at biomarker discovery is a big data exercise often involving very large 
numbers of WSIs of tissue from many patients. The more aggregated the data, the less 
personalised and potentially intrusive it is. Again, WSIs for such exercises are often de-
identified. De-identification is a matter of removing explicit links between pathological data 
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and patient identities. This means that that outputs from a big exercise cannot typically be 
used to identify the data subjects concerned or disadvantage them. It is true that de-
identified data is sometimes not anonymised in the strict sense of making all inferences –
including computationally-assisted inferences-- to the identities of data subjects absolutely 
impossible. Absolutely irreversible de-identification is, if possible at all, very difficult, and 
might be clinically undesirable, since some of the results of big data analytics might be 
relevant to ongoing treatment of some of the patients whose tissue was imaged and de-
identified. In any case, the techniques that would be needed to turn standardly de-
identified data into identifiable data are often extremely sophisticated and expensive to 
apply, and it is unclear what would motivate the use of such sophistication or large amounts 
of money to get to the identities associated with a pathology data base, still less one 
particular identity, by a hacker. So while de-identification may not amount to out and out 
anonymisation in the sense of GDPR, it may amount to anonymisation for most practical 
purposes. Once data are deidentified, then, there are fewer objections to collecting and 
processing more and more of it for testing and validating algorithms. On the contrary, the 
larger the data sets used for training and validation, the lower false positive and negative 
rates are likely to be, other things being equal, with corresponding clinical advantages.  
 
III. Linking Pathological with Biobanked Samples: Repurposing and Consent Regimes 
 
The conclusion of the last section is that the typical rationale for data minimisation does not 
straightforwardly call into question the big-data requirements of computational pathology. 
We have not, however, seen the last of the tension between data ethics and big data 
requirements.  Consider the following claim from Lewis et al: 
 12 
Repositories containing high quality biospecimens linked with robust and relevant 
clinical and pathological information are required for the discovery and validation of 
biomarkers for disease diagnosis, progression and response to treatment. Ready 
access to such material is fundamental for meaningful translational 
research. In the case of cancer research, tumour banks have been established to 
procure fresh as well as formalin-fixed, paraffin-embedded (FFPE) tumour tissues 
and non-tumour control samples. These tissue collections are increasingly 
complemented by matched samples of blood, urine, saliva and other bodily fluids 
where appropriate…. 
While prospectively targeted collections of appropriately consented human samples 
are the ideal for translational research programmes, realistically the systematic 
accumulation of large numbers of samples linked to clinical follow-up, apart from 
being costly, may take many years to become established. Yet readily available 
resources for translational research currently exist within many pathology 
laboratories; indeed, in the surgical pathology archives across the United Kingdom 
(UK)’s National Healthcare Service (NHS), vast numbers of FFPE tumour and non-
tumour control samples are currently stored often untouched for a minimum of 
thirty years before disposal.21 
 
Lewis is suggesting a repurposing of  samples in pathology archives for whole side imaging, 
with a view to connecting analysed WSI data  with matched data from biobanked samples 
                                                 
21 Lewis, C., McQuaid, S., Hamilton, P. W., Salto-Tellez, M., McArt, D. & James, J. A. (2016). Building a 
‘repository of science’: The importance of integrating biobanks within molecular pathology 
programmes’ European Journal of Cancer 67:193. 
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(blood, urine) and other related data (including radiological data). Why, if at all, is this 
problematic morally?  
 
Repurposing of personal data in big data research is in itself morally questionable from the 
standpoint of research ethics22 and data law.23  To enlarge on the research ethics issues, 
digital data is subject to fusion or analytics often without the knowledge of people who 
have given consent to its collection. Fusion and analytics are not always subject to formal 
oversight. Once data is in digital form, there is often confusion as to who should decide 
about its reuse and which reuses are legitimate. Consents to the use of tissue for research, 
for example, may reasonably be understood to extend to the use of WSIs of tissue for 
pathological investigations. The further research possibilities of WSIs, however, may lie in 
data science rather than medicine. It is unclear whether these indirect uses of tissue are 
grasped by those giving consent. Again, it is unclear whether the secondary uses of WSI data 
for algorithm development, including algorithm development for profit, are always a use of 
data for “research” envisaged or understood by the cancer patient.    
 
The issues are further complicated, in the UK at least, by the ethics and law of tissue 
retention. There are two cases, corresponding to the difference between a diagnostic 
archive and a post mortem archive. A diagnostic archive is composed of samples taken from 
the living for a consented medical procedure. These can be used for that procedure and 
                                                 
22 Clark, K., Duckham, M., Guillemin, M. (2019). Advancing the ethical use of digital data in human 
research: challenges and strategies to promote ethical practice. Ethics of Information 
Technology 21, 59–73.  
23 Steinmann M., Matei S.A., Collmann J. (2016) A theoretical framework for ethical reflection in big 
data research. In J. Collmann & S. Matei (Ed.) Ethical reasoning in big data: Computational social 
sciences. Switzerland AG: Springer. 
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research so long as there is no objection to research from the patient.  Samples taken from 
deceased patients are treated differently. They are covered by the Human Tissue Act 2004, 
which was in part a reaction to scandals about the retention without permission of organs 
and tissue, sometimes extracted from children, in at least two English hospitals in the 1980s 
and 90s.24 The Act resulted from a public protest not only against the retention of tissue, 
but the failure to put it to any use in research. Tissue samples in post mortem archives 
accordingly require consent for both storage and research.   
 
Do restrictions in the Human Tissue Act inspired by loose hospital practice decades agostill 
fit public opinion about the use of tissue? There is some evidence that, in the UK at least, 
attitudes to tissue retention for research have changed.  In 2017, a significant consultation 
exercise took place on future-proofing consent to the use of tissue and health data, 
sponsored by the Human Tissue Authority, the regulator associated with the Human Tissue 
Act.25 Participants in general strongly supported a relatively relaxed consent regime to 
minimise obstacles to health research. They were against the “waste” of already extracted 
material –its not being used for research-- through lack of clarity on consent. They 
recognised a tension between, on the one hand, giving genuinely informed consent to 
collection of data on tissue and other biological samples, and, on the other hand, 
experiencing information overload. At times they worried that inferences might be made 
from tissue about individual identities and identified people’s lifestyles, but they were 
reassured by the fact that studies typically used aggregated data and methods of 
                                                 
24 Burton, J.L. & Wells, M. (2002). The Alder Hey affair. Archives of Disease in Childhood 86, 4-7. 
25 Human Tissue Authority (2019). Public dialogue on consent to use human tissue and linked health 
data in health research: One year on. Retrieved from https://www.hta.gov.uk/news/public-dialogue-
consent-use-human-tissue-and-linked-health-data-health-research-one-year  
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deidentification for tissue or data linked to patient records. Finally, when given the choice 
between, on the one hand, broad, one-off consent to future research on tissue26 and, on the 
other hand, dynamic (or periodically renewed and possibly overloading) informed consent, 
they preferred broad consent. The only “red lines” were the use of tissue by profit-making 
commercial firms. We come back to this in section V. 
 
Public support for a broad consent regime as opposed to a “dynamic” one is not by itself a 
moral justification for that regime, even when that support is informed by the purposes and 
methods of biobank-based research or by research involving repositories of science. But if 
there is a clear health gain, potentially to a population, from tissue research in general, and 
if broad consent enables more of a gain more quickly without countervailing harm, then 
that is already something of a moral argument for a broad consent regime. There may be 
further arguments for broad consent rather than dynamic consent based e.g. on the way 
that repeated consenting of biobank donors may create false expectations of personalised 
gains for donors.27 
 
Biobanks collect samples from donors to be used longitudinally for research that benefits a 
wider population from which donors are drawn.  These samples are collected with consent 
from the donors to storage and research. Diagnostic archives of pathology, as already 
noted, are different: they are part of the medical record. “Repositories of science” in the 
                                                 
26 Broad consent is in the spirit of the new NHS opt out for research with (de-identified) patient data, 
in that the presumed default position for a patient is broad agreement to research conducted under 
the protections of data law and Research Ethics Committees.  
27 Steinsbekk, K., Myskja, B. & Solberg, B. (2013). Broad Consent versus dynamic consent in biobank 
research. Is passive participation an ethical problem? European Journal of Human Genetics 21, 897–
902. 
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sense of Lewis et al bring together not only biobanked samples but those and tissue samples 
in diagnostic and post mortem archives. Granted that the Human Tissue Act strongly 
discourages the repurposing of pathology archive samples from the deceased, is there a 
good moral argument against scanning the tissue as a part of a WSI-analytics exercise?     
 
We cannot see that there is. If the scan contributes to training pathologists in tumour 
recognition or produces images for training an algorithm with the power to make improved 
diagnosis or grading of tumours, then it makes a contribution to saving lives. It is hard to see 
how the now dead patient is disrespected or exploited by scanning a donated tissue sample, 
since scanning is not contrary to a stated preference, or out of keeping with a previously 
collected consent. Nor is scanning a case of breaking faith with the motivation of the Human 
Tissue Act. What scandalised people was the storage of tissue and organs, especially the 
organs of children, without permission and to no clinical or research purpose . The contents 
of pathological archives are kept with permission and were once put to a clinical purpose 
when their donors were living. Scanning tissue from these archives to make digital images is 
not obviously a misuse of tissue, and had the (de-identified) disused organs and tissue 
samples at the Alder Hey or Bristol Royal Infirmary simply been photographed for research 
purposes rather than stored, it is not clear than anyone would have been scandalised.   
 
There is a corollary for the assembly of data sets that are different from full scale 
repositories of science but that promote complementary purposes. A pathology data lake 
assembles WSIs made from tissue samples of many research centres into a single digital 
repository suitable for the training of algorithms for diagnosis, prognosis and general 
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biomarker discovery. In the PATHLAKE project,28 the digital repository brings together de-
identified samples of various cancer types from various UK centres, the original tissue 
having been gathered under a variety of consent regimes. This repository will be open to 
commercial algorithm development by commercial partners who belong to the PATHLAKE 
consortium, as well as to others who can be granted access to the data under certain 
conditions, including payment conditions for commercial applicants.  Although a number of 
moral issues are raised by public-private partnerships in computational pathology (see 
section V), the repurposing of tissue samples for not-for-profit clinically useful algorithm 
development seems permissible if the repurposing of the otherwise unused contents of 
pathology archives in general is permissible. And we have argued that it is. 
   
 
IV. “Wholly automated” processes and explainability 
 
So far, we have identified a range of tensions between data ethics, research ethics, tissue-
use ethics and AI ethics when applied to digital pathology. In this section, AI ethics, data 
ethics and medical ethics move into the foreground and research ethics slips into the 
background. The issue to be discussed is the difference made by digital pathology to the 
reliability and intelligibility of cancer diagnosis and grading.  This issue can be sharpened by 
reference to a norm of AI ethics on the one hand, and a norm of data processing law on the 
other. The norm of AI ethics is that algorithms ought to be as transparent or as explainable 
                                                 
28 Colling, R., Pitman, H., Oien, K., Rajpoot, N., Macklin, P., Snead, D., Sackville, T. & Verrill, C. (2019) 
Artificial intelligence in digital pathology: a roadmap to routine use in clinical practice. Journal of 
Pathology 249, 143-50. 
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as possible;29 the norm of data processing law (GDPR) is that no decision-making with 
significant effects on an individual should be wholly automated.30 
 
At first sight, both of these norms tell against computational pathology in some form. An 
important output of computational pathology is automated classification of tissue into 
normal and malignant. Patients, GPs, some pathologists and some oncologists will have no 
idea how a diagnosis generated by an algorithm has been derived, and, if they look at the 
Best Practice Recommendations of the Royal College, they may think that the College’s own 
attitude toward digital pathology is at best cautiously supportive   These facts are certainly 
consistent with, and may even support, a norm to the effect that AI-driven diagnosis on its 
own should not trigger treatment, such as  chemotherapy or radiotherapy, with major 
effects.  Of course, it is highly implausible that such treatment would flow automatically 
from a diagnosis –human or AI-generated-- in any case. The treatment would need informed 
consent.  But since even the communication of a cancer diagnosis is often traumatic, and 
since an AI-generated diagnosis can sometimes be wrong, there may be support for a norm 
to the effect that an AI-generated diagnosis should be communicated directly to the patient 
by a doctor who is well informed about  the relevant AI and in a position to explain it to 
some extent. The norm of circumspect communication by people who understand relevant 
AI may have the odd exceptions, as when an AI scientist is the subject of a diagnosis, and his 
or her medical team is familiar with digital pathology, but does it not hold for large groups 
                                                 
29 Floridi, L., Cowls, J., Beltrametti, M., Chatila, R., Chazerand, P., Dignum, V. & Vayena, E. (2018). 
AI4People - an ethical framework for a good AI society: Opportunities, risks, principles, and 
recommendations. Minds and Machines 28(4), 689–707. 
30 Information Commissioner’s Office. Rights related to automated decision making including 




of patients who know nothing about computers, and for large numbers of medically trained 
personnel who know little or nothing about AI? 
 
The answer to this question, it seems to us, is “it depends”. To begin with, what is it for a 
decision or diagnosis to be “wholly automated”?  Whole slide images are humanly 
annotated before algorithms are trained to produce diagnoses and estimates of life 
expectancy. Machine-generated  diagnoses are trained to agree with a set of expert human 
ones which establish “ground truth” for the relevant algorithm. Admittedly, deep-learning 
after supervised machine-learning introduces inscrutability. Furthermore, various machine-
learning approaches permit the discovery of patterns between diagnoses and e.g. the deep 
architecture of tissues, that human pathologists do not recognise and are perhaps incapable 
of recognising, patterns that unexpectedly track the presence of tumours. That does not 
mean that the machine is wholly unconstrained by judgements of human pathologists. 31   
 
 The cases that most strongly support the GDPR norm against automated decision-making  
are ones in which administrative decisions – decisions to investigate, distribute benefits, or 
assign penalties– are subject to requirements of impartiality, consistency, and 
proportionality. Here the norm against automatic decision-making operates against the 
injection into an algorithm of personal bias or disproportionality. But making diagnoses in 
pathology is not like this. Although it is possible for algorithms to be biased by an 
insufficiently varied training set, this is not likely to be the result of the influence of the 
stereotyping that can blight administrative decisions. 
                                                 
31 Topol, E .J. (2019). High-performance medicine: the convergence of human and artificial 
intelligence. Nature Medicine 25, 44–56. 
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Let us turn now to the demand for “explainability” in algorithms. This, too, makes most 
sense in relation to automated administrative decisions e.g. lending decisions based on 
automated credit scoring;  automated sentencing decisions, and some  decisions about 
prioritising the deployment of police in response to calls for help. Digital pathology does not 
lend itself to the norm of explainability in algorithms if explainability is a safeguard against 
arbitrariness and unfairness. Arbitrariness and unfairness are a matter of how the human 
will is directed and what considerations are given weight in decisions that are made 
primarily by humans. On the other hand, whether someone gets a cancer diagnosis, or a 
higher or lower grading of cancer, based on WSI data, is not a matter of arbitrary human 
decision. It is a matter of what conditions of tissue are, independently of anyone’s will, 
markers of tumour development. How algorithms track those markers is a separate issue, 
and even if it is unexplainable in cases of deep learning, its being unexplainable is 
compatible with a low error rate in diagnosis and grading, and, in particular, an error rate 
lower than that of human diagnosis and grading. The relatively low error rate is morally 
important when the alternative to AI-derived diagnosis and grading would be human 
diagnosis and grading.   
 
Another morally important consideration is speed. The speedier diagnosis and grading are 
with better or comparable error rates, the more they encourage earlier and effective 
treatment. This is a large part of the moral argument for relying on computational 
pathology.  It is true that the difficulties for doctors not well versed in AI of communicating 
the basis for the accuracy of AI-driven diagnosis, and the difficulty for patients of 
understanding AI, hamper informed consent. But this is not a decisive consideration against 
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relying on computational pathology; it is an argument instead for training doctors in AI so 
that are not mere mouthpieces for algorithms.32  
 
Citizen jury work on explainability of algorithms shows that, for patients, it is the 
effectiveness, rather than the intelligibility, of the algorithm that matters in medical 
contexts.33  This means that even if the AI behind an algorithm is inscrutable to specialists – 
a case of the “black box” problem – that too may be regarded as secondary under citizen 
jury conditions, that is, under conditions of relatively full information about the significance 
of black box problems in practice.34 
 
Of course, computational pathology does lend itself to the medical ethics norm of informed 
consent for biopsies that will lead to algorithm-based diagnosis. And the medical ethics 
norm of informed consent does require that, as far as reasonably possible, the patient know 
what the biopsy is for and how reliable a diagnosis will be. But meeting this norm when the 
diagnosis is AI-driven does not translate into a demand that the patient be given an 
introductory course on AI. Neither does informed consent to a procedure involving an X ray 
involve an introduction to either radiography or radiology. What matters is to be given an 
                                                 
32 See Schiff, D and Borenstein J (2019) ‘How Should Clinicians Communicate With Patients About 
the Roles of Artificially Intelligent Team Members? AMA J Ethics. 2019;21(2):E138-145. This paper 
makes the good point that many people in different roles share responsibility for making algorithmic 
results in medicine intelligible. Not only doctors but coders and others are or ought to be involved. 
For general discussion about AI and medicine, see Char DS, Shah NH, Magnus D. (2018) 
‘Implementing machine learning in health care—addressing ethical challenges. N Engl J 
Med.378(11):981-983and Obermeyer Z, Emanuel EJ (2016) Predicting the future—big data, machine 
learning, and clinical medicine. N Engl J Med. 375(13):1216-1219. 
 
33 National Institute of Health Research Greater Manchester Patient Safety Translational Research 
Centre (2019), Citizens’ Juries on Explainable Artificial Intelligence, Retrieved from 
http://www.patientsafety.manchester.ac.uk/research/themes/safety-informatics/citizens-juries/  
34 Castelvecchi, D. (2016). Can we open the black box of AI? Nature 538, 21-23. 
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accurate and understandable account of the ill-effects of a small dose of radiation compared 
to the benefits to a choice of treatment after access to X ray imagery. The comparable 
information about automated diagnosis might be information about “concordance” and 
“discordance” rates between digital pathology and pathology with light microscopy,35 and 
general information about pattern discovery in WSIs. 
 
V. Computational Pathology and Commercial Interests 
 
We come finally to the ethical issues arising from the role of commercial firms in digital and 
computational pathology. These issues have a distinctive character when commercial firms 
use data from a public health service, such as the UK National Health Service, with unique 
and valuable data sets, and where the consequences of misuse might be particularly 
damaging to an institution at the heart of a national welfare state. (We concentrate on the 
UK context, and will ignore the contrasting issues that arise in jurisdictions dominated by 
private healthcare, such as the USA.)   
 
Scanner manufacturers are a leading type of commercial participant in digital pathology. 
Their equipment produces WSIs, and the more widely distributed it is in hospitals or 
laboratories, the more money they make.   Scanner manufacturers, then, have an interest in 
the growth of digital and computational pathology quite apart from the gains to patients, 
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and they have paid for some of the studies that compare the accuracy of diagnoses based 
on WSIs to diagnoses using microscopes and slides.36  
 
Patients, for their part, are sometimes suspicious of for-profit uses of tissue and data. 
According to the HTA report of the public dialogue on biobanking data that we referred to in 
section III,   
 
Participants’ most common red lines were no access for commercial companies like 
insurance companies or marketing companies using data to sell a product.37 
 
The same red lines are reflected in the UK NHS   Code of Conduct for data-driven research.38  
Principle 10 is directed specifically to for-profit technology developers and researchers. To 
this audience the code says, “Define the commercial strategy”. And the code spells out what 
this means. Among other things, commercial activity has to conform to a Framework 
introduced in July 2019.39 This restricts purposes that can be pursued with patient data to 
those that benefit health, and it asks that authorities in charge of health data be aware of 
the commercial value of data sets, prohibit exclusivity in access to it for commercial 
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technology. Retrieved from https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-conduct-for-
data-driven-health-and-care-technology/initial-code-of-conduct-for-data-driven-health-and-care-
technology#principle-10-define-the-commercial-strategy 
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partners, audit use of it, and communicate arrangements and practices to data subjects and 
the wider public.  
 
In keeping with a Framework that insists on openness with the public in general and 
patients in particular, consultations or “dialogues” involving a wide range of stakeholders in 
data-driven research will probably be relied upon to inform its application.  Such a dialogue 
was recently conducted by the UK Academy of Medical Sciences40  . The Academy study 
found “universal support” 
 
for data-driven technologies which are based on scans and imaging automation for 
diagnosis. Data collected and used in this way for direct clinical care was accepted by 
all participants; these new technologies were enthusiastically welcomed especially 
by healthcare professionals. There was support for outcomes from machine learning 
being used to support shared decision making.41 
 
This endorsement clearly includes digital and computational pathology. Patients, health care 
workers and non-affiliated members of the public seem to support this technology whether 
or not it depends on commercial manufacturers of scanners. Participants in the Academy 
Study appear not to have been asked whether the use of images for developing 
commercially saleable algorithms was supported where this also advanced diagnosis. But in 
                                                 
40 Castell, S., Robinson, L. & Ashford, H. (2018). Future data-driven technologies and the implications 
for use of patient data, Ipsos Mori, Retrieved from https://acmedsci.ac.uk/file-download/6616969 
41 Ibid. 
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both the Academy and HTA studies it was non-health uses of data – for marketing or 
insurance – that seemed to be most disapproved of. 
 
Does the strong public support for imaging research and data use help to legitimise 
commercial activity in this area, when that activity also conforms to the exacting 2019 
Framework? We believe the answer is ‘Yes, for practical purposes’. After all, the public 
dialogue approach fits in with the democratic principle that those affected by policy and 
practice should have a say in it, and public dialogues insure informed support by using the 
techniques of citizen juries. Experts are able to communicate to the public relevant facts 
about the relevant science and the groups involved in research.  
 
The question left open by the dialogue approach is whether the interests of e.g. scanner 
manufacturers are adequately represented. Are the manufacturers and other commercial 
interests able to participate, or to be heard in deliberations leading to a Framework, and, if 
so, how?  In some jurisdictions, the UK, the US and Canada included, academic research is 
sometimes geared to partnerships between commercial actors, academics and public sector 
bodies, with commercial partners being expected to make “in kind” contributions, 
sometimes through the donation of equipment or staff time to joint projects, alongside 
grants from government. Digital and computational pathology are being pursued this way in 
Britain, under research organised and funded by Innovate UK. The terms of that co-
operation are as much in need of a multi-party dialogue as the use of NHS data, for at least 
two reasons. First, not only data subjects but academic researchers are liable to be at a 
disadvantage in contract negotiations over rights to the proceeds of joint research. Second, 
the estimate of in-kind contributions in dollars and cents or pounds and pence is deeply 
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contentious.  In this case the multi-party dialogue cannot just involve the public and health 
care professionals. Commercial partners are clearly stakeholders. 
 
It might be thought that since commercial firms and industry bodies have channels of their 
own for making representations to government, the need for them to be included in a 
dialogue that gauges public opinion for data use or that determines a framework for 
conducting data-driven research is correspondingly slight. Again, it might be thought that 
when scanner manufacturers belong to corporations with global reach and resources for 
influencing legislation, their being included in dialogues adds to an already disproportionate 
influence. Our own view is that at least their reaction to dialogues that exclude them should 
be taken into account by governments and regulators, if not the public. But their views need 
not disagree with those of the public in relation to every kind or use of health data. It is 
perfectly possible that digital and computational pathology are unalloyed goods from quite 





The preceding discussion has identified and outlined approaches to resolving certain ethical 
issues in computational pathology.   In particular, certain tensions between computational 
pathology, data ethics and tissue ethics have been addressed. Repurposing of tissue use for 
scanning and research seems highly justifiable. Ethical issues in the handling and storage of 
tissue for research seem to be tangential to research with WSIs, since WSIs do not seem to 
alter or damage tissue, and since research with WSIs also avoids the “waste” for research 
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purposes of tissue in pathology archives. Again, neither data hunger nor fully automated 
decision-making in computational pathology seem to carry the risks that personal data 
minimisation and other principles are typically intended to counteract.  Demands for data 
minimisation and the ban on automated decision-making seem to be prompted by problems 
of arbitrariness in the application of rules that do have clear counterparts in cancer 
diagnosis, prognosis and grading. The business ethics of commercial firms in computational 
pathology is another sort of issue, and one that has been anticipated early by codes of 
conduct in the UK. It is too soon to say whether Principle 10 of the NHS code is adequate for 
resolving this issue, but it is also too soon to say that it is not. 
 
  
